Foreword: On Academic Fads and Fashions by Sunstein, Cass R.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 99 Issue 6 
2001 
Foreword: On Academic Fads and Fashions 
Cass R. Sunstein 
University of Chicago Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Legal Writing and Research Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1251 (2001). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol99/iss6/2 
 
This Foreword is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan 
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
FOREWORD: 
ON ACADEMIC FADS AND FASHIONS 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Why did critical legal studies disappear? Will it reappear? Why 
does the Federalist Society prosper? Why, and when, do people write 
books on constitutional law, rather than tort law or antitrust? Why did 
people laugh at the notion of "animal rights," and why do they now 
laugh less? Why do law professors seem increasingly respectful of 
"textualism" and "originalism," ideas that produced ridicule and con­
tempt just two decades ago? How do book reviewers choose what 
books to review? Why has law and economics had such staying power? 
Academics are generally committed to truth, and they are drawn 
to ideas that can be shown to be good ones. The most optimistic an­
swer to these questions is that ideas survive because and to the extent 
that they are true or good. On this view, law and economics has out­
lasted critical legal studies because it has much more to offer. Textu­
alism and originalism have had a resurgence because much can be said 
on their behalf. Book reviewers, in the academic domain, tend to 
choose to review the best books. 
In my view, these claims contain some truth, but they are far too 
optimistic. Academics, like everyone else, are subject to cascade ef­
fects. They start, join, and accelerate bandwagons. More particularly, 
they are subject to the informational signals sent by the acts and 
statements of others. They participate in creating the very signals to 
which they respond. Academics, like everyone else, are also suscepti­
ble to the reputational pressures imposed by the (perceived) beliefs of 
others. They respond to these pressures, and by so doing, they help to 
amplify them. It is for these reasons that fads, fashions, and band­
wagon effects can be found in academia, including the academic study 
of law. Fortunately, the underlying forces can spark creativity and give 
new ideas a chance to prosper. Unfortunately, these same forces can 
also produce error and confusion. 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of 
Chicago, Law School and Department of Political Science. - Ed. I am grateful to Jack 
Goldsmith, Tracey Meares, Eric Posner, and Richard Posner for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft. 
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Sometimes cascades have enduring effects. But in many fields aca­
demic cascades are fragile, with numerous people focusing on issues 
and adopting methods that disappear in short order. Some cascades 
produce unpredictable and seemingly random movements, as external 
shocks lead in dramatic directions. In social life, small sparks cause 
wildfires; it is for this reason, among others, that we cannot easily pre­
dict future academic trends, or foresee new movements in the aca­
demic study of law. (In 1985, would it have been possible to predict 
the resurgence, in the 1990s, of interest in the study of social norms?1 
Or the rise of interest in cyberspace? In the Second Amendment?) 
There is even a tipping point phenomenon here, in which a certain 
pressure, from the perceived views of others, can produce a sudden 
"rush" toward a particular methodology or point of view.2 
In this Essay, I attempt to cast light on the general topic of aca­
demic bandwagons and cascades, with particular reference to law. 
Several caveats are in order. First, my focus here is on trends in aca­
demic law, but informational and reputational signals are ubiquitous. 
The same forces discussed here help explain many social movements, 
including reactions to environmental risks, the rise and fall of commu­
nism, the success or failure of students and job candidates, the creation 
of ethnic identifications, and the rise and partial fall of affirmative ac­
tion. 3 Second, I do not mean to present any criticism of legal scholar­
ship in general, or to depict those who produce it as especially prone 
to informational and reputational influences. A general attack on legal 
scholarship would be senseless, if only because so much of it is obvi­
ously excellent. Third, I aim only to establish the existence of cascade 
effects, not to give a clear test for distinguishing cascades from cases in 
which approaches and arguments have spread because of their merits 
(though some of my remarks will bear on that issue). Fourth, my 
treatment will be informal and anecdotal, offering examples that will, I 
hope, be intuitive and familiar. With respect to the underlying phe­
nomena, I draw on some more systematic and formal treatments,4 
1. Fueled by ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991). 
2. For a popular treatment, see MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT (2000). 
3. See, e.g., David Hirschleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and 
Informational Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188, 189 (Mariano 
Tommasi & Kathryn Ierulli eds., 1995); TIMUR KURAN, PUBLIC LIES, PRIVATE TRUTHS 
(1997). 
4. See supra note 3. A helpful overview is Sushi! Bikchandani et al., Learning From the 
Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 
(1998). In the social sciences, the analytical literature on cascades begins with Magoroh 
Maruyama, The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying Mutual Causal Processes, 51 AM. 
SCIENTIST 164 (1963); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHA YIOR 
(1978); and Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AMER. J. OF 
Soc. 1420 (1978). For analysis of purely informational cascades, see Sushi! Bikchandani, 
David Hirshleifer, & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as 
Informational Cascades, 100 J. OF POL. ECON. 992 (1992); David Hirschleifer, supra note 3; 
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both general and particular, and try to apply the central ideas to the 
academic context. Obviously a great deal might be said about this 
topic; my brief treatment here is intended only to be a start. 
II. A NOTE ON ACADEMIC UTILITY FuNCTIONS AND THE MARKET 
FOR IDEAS 
To make progress on this topic, it is necessary to have some sense 
of what academics care about, and also to know something about the 
nature of the market for academic ideas. On these subjects, I hope not 
to say anything controversial. But because some account is implicit in 
any description of cascades, I offer some brief notations.5 
Most academics care about what most people care about. They 
seek to retain their jobs and to have the good opinion of (relevant) 
others. Few of them are indifferent to status. But they also care, more 
than most, about ideas, and they are willing to forego various benefits 
in order to be able to think and talk about issues suitable for teaching 
and academic research. Many academics are interested in pursuing 
truth as such. Those who do or use empirical work often fall in this 
category, and the same is true for those whose basic goal is to help 
produce clarity and coherence in the law. In the context of law, there 
is an additional point: Many academics would like to contribute to im­
provements in law and society by helping to make law better in the 
domains of, for example, antitrust law, race or sex equality, and free­
dom of speech. Of course academics are a diverse lot on these counts. 
For some, reputation matters a great deal; for others, the pursuit of 
truth or justice is especially important. 
There is also a market for academic ideas, and this market will 
have significant effects on what academics do. In this market, aca­
demics are the producers, while consumers include other academics, 
students, government officials, judges, and law clerks. The extent of 
interest from these groups will of course vary with the material; some 
academic work, for instance, is of direct interest only to other aca­
demics. The market here is unusual in many ways, above all because 
no one pays directly for what academics produce. Law reviews usually 
do not compensate contributors for articles and essays, and the same is 
true for other journals (in economics and philosophy, for example) in 
Lisa Anderrson & Charles Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 81 AM. ECON. 
REV. 847 (1997); Abhiijit Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. ECON. 797 
(1992). See also B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theory of Conformity, 102 J. POL. ECON. 841 
(1994) (discussing similar mechanisms). 
5. This section was not included in the initial drafts of the paper. It was suggested by 
several commentators on an earlier draft, who urged an elaboration of the utility function of 
law professors and of the market for academic ideas. Obviously I think that the commenta­
tors are right, but the fact that these topics are discussed here is itself an illustration of the 
forces I discuss in this Essay. 
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which law professors might publish. Publishers will pay for the right to 
publish books, and professors receive royalties, but little money is 
usually involved, and hence the motivation for writing books is rarely 
material for academics. On the other hand, indirect compensation -
monetary and nonmonetary - is omnipresent. Job opportunities are a 
direct function of what academics produce, and at many schools, sal­
ary is partly a reflection of quality and quantity of publications. Invita­
tions to conferences and the like - dreaded by some, welcomed by 
many - are also affected by the perceived quality of academic work. 
It is here, above all, that the market disciplines academic activity. 
In a well-functioning market, only or mostly valuable ideas will be 
produced - although of course some ideas will be valuable even if 
they are misleading or incorrect. But it is not at all clear that an ordi­
nary economic market, based on the willingness-to-pay criterion, is a 
good way to produce valuable ideas in law or elsewhere. Such a mar­
ket might well cater unduly to existing tastes or to the interests of 
those with a great deal of money to pay; research funding by groups 
with a large financial stake in outcomes is therefore a problem. The 
complex system of indirect compensation, alongside the tenure sys­
tem, is commonly defended as a way of insulating the production of 
ideas from ordinary markets. If this complex system works extremely 
well (by the appropriate criteria), it will lack "bad cascades" - that is, 
cascades in which valueless ideas travel not because they are valuable, 
but because of the mechanisms that I will be discussing here. But I will 
suggest that in many contexts, an absence of private information, to­
gether with a concern for reputation and various features of human 
cognition, can produce academic cascades that are bad as well as good. 
Ill. INFORMATION-INDUCED ACADEMIC CASCADES 
Academic cascades take two .forms: informational and reputa­
tional. Let us begin with the role of information. 
Most people, in most domains, lack reliable information about 
what is true and what is right. For this reason, they are interested in 
the signals of others. The point holds for the selection of movies and 
restaurants and carpets; it holds for ideas as well. If you are unsure 
whether textualism is a sensible or pernicious approach to constitu­
tional interpretation, you might care a great deal about other people's 
views. Of course academics, especially older ones, are sometimes set­
tled in their views. Often they are confident that they know what to 
think, and to that extent, they are not terribly susceptible to the views 
of others. (Notice here that the precondition for immunity to informa­
tional influences is confidence about one's preexisting views, not ade­
quate or accurate information.) But among some groups, and in some 
fields, any settlement is provisional and somewhat fragile. In many 
fields, including law, young people in particular can both influence and 
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be influenced by informational signals. If many people are susceptible 
to influence, cascades can readily develop. The significant swings in 
legal scholarship over the last decades suggest that academic lawyers 
are indeed susceptible. 
Suppose, for example, that John, a young academic, does not know 
whether textualism is a sensible approach to constitutional interpreta­
tion, but that Mary, a slightly older academic, is in favor of it.6 If John 
is otherwise in equipoise, but attaches value to what Mary thinks be­
cause she seems wise or has often been right in the past, it is easy to 
see how John might come to Mary's view. If John and Mary believe 
that textualism makes sense, Sally, a contemporary of John, might be 
moved to agree, at least if she lacks any reason to be confident that 
they are wrong. And once John, Mary, and Sally come to a certain 
view, David, a recently hired faculty member, will likely agree with 
them unless he has enough private knowledge - or, more precisely, 
confidence - about his antecedent view to stand in their way. At 
some point one or more of these people might even produce an article 
or book in defense of textualism. 
As stylized as this example seems, I believe that it captures a great 
deal about academic movements, in law and elsewhere. Consider, for 
example, the rise of feminism within the law schools, starting roughly 
in the mid-1980s. In many places, feminism appears to have succeeded 
through a kind of informational cascade, as people who would other­
wise be skeptical or unsure came to think that feminist approaches had 
something to offer - not (in many cases) because they carefully inves­
tigated the underlying claims and believed that they were illuminating 
or right, but because the beliefs of others seemed hard to resist for 
those lacking a great deal of confidence in their own (skeptical) judg­
ments. If so many people seemed to think feminist approaches to law 
were valuable, mustn't they be right?7 
Or consider the life and apparent death of the critical legal studies 
movement, which flourished (again speaking roughly) from 1977 to 
1989. When I was a visiting professor at Harvard Law School in 1987, 
critical legal studies powerfully influenced both students and younger 
faculty. A significant number of students appeared to sense what criti­
cal legal studies was about, and they seemed to agree with it. A signifi­
cant number of assistant professors (some of them now professors, 
with apparently little continuing interest in critical legal studies) were 
in the same category. Within both groups, the informational signals 
sent by the large number of critical legal studies members were ex-
. tremely important. 
6. The example adapts from the treatment in Bikchandani, supra note 4. 
7. In some contexts, a possible answer is that they might be wrong, especially if they are 
participating in a cascade, rather than acting independently. 
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At the University of Chicago Law School, much the same can be 
said, then and now, about the economic analysis of law. Many faculty 
members engage in economic analysis of law, and a majority of the 
faculty shows considerable interest in the basic approach. As a general 
rule, younger faculty members are especially interested in the infor­
mational signals sent by their colleagues, and at Chicago, many of 
them end up doing work that is influenced by economics. Cascade ef­
fects are even easier to observe within the student body, as certain 
concepts (involving, for example, the value of efficiency, the implica­
tions of the Coase theorem, and the futility of redistributive regula­
tion) spread as if by contagion. Of course it is true that many students, 
and some faculty members, show no interest in the economic analysis 
of law. But mere exposure to economic thinking, voiced in many set­
tings (including workshops, lunch discussions, and comments on arti­
cles), leads in the expected directions. 
As informational cascades develop, people end up amplifying the 
very informational signals to which they have responded. Scholarship, 
including the production of articles and books, is much affected by 
processes of this kind. If this is so, it is possible to predict, with some 
confidence, that the publication of books on various topics or with 
various methodologies often will be highly concentrated over time, 
showing that fads and fashions play a role in the academic world as 
elsewhere. 
In making these claims, I do not mean to make any normative 
claims about feminism, critical legal studies, or economic analysis of 
law. Nor do I mean to suggest that those who are vulnerable to infor­
mational pressures are weak or irrational. People who know that they 
have limited information certainly should pay attention to the signals 
given by others. And whether pressures of this kind will lead in desir­
able directions cannot be decided in the abstract. All that can be said 
is that the underlying mechanisms give little reason for confidence that 
academic "movements" will be good ones. Ideas can spread, even 
among people with some expertise, despite the fact that little is to be 
said on their behalf. 
From these examples, we can also see the possibility of purely or 
mostly local informational cascades. Outside the academic world, 
some communities come to believe that abandoned hazardous waste 
dumps are extremely dangerous, whereas others think that they pose 
no hazard at all. So, too, some law schools might come to embrace the 
economic analysis of law, whereas others might see enthusiasm for 
traditional doctrinal analysis - not because of a large number of in­
dependent judgments, but because of mutual interactions and influ­
ences. 
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IV. REPUTATION AND REPUTATIONAL CASCADES 
It should be clear that something important is missing from the pic­
ture: people's concerns about their reputations.8 Generally people care 
about what others think of them, and most academics are, on this 
count, like most other people. 
In many law schools and economics departments, an effort to show 
that centralized planning really can work well, or to vindicate social­
ism, or to show that people are irrational, would be very risky, no mat­
ter the quality of the relevant work. People might be ridiculed. They 
might well jeopardize their careers. At many law schools, the same 
would be true for people who attempted to show that current differ­
ences between men and women are biological rather than social, and 
to bring evidence to that effect to bear on legal issues. 
Reputational considerations influence the public behavior of most 
people, not excluding academics. This is not because people lack in­
tegrity, or are sycophantic, or are unwilling to follow their own paths. 
It is simply because most people, most of the time, want others to 
think well - or at least not ill - of them. Of course, people have 
varying susceptibility to reputational pressures. Some people can with­
stand a great deal; others will be inclined to take the safe course, 
showing reluctance to say, or especially to publish, anything that could 
create trouble for them in the future. And of course sometimes those 
who incur reputational sanctions in one place (the nonacademic world, 
for example) will reap reputational benefits elsewhere (perhaps their 
local academic community). Those who seem to be venturing out on 
their own, and to be "brave," might in fact be motivated by the goal of 
gaining status within a particular group. 
Because most people care about the views of others, and because 
people have varying, rather than uniform, susceptibility to reputa­
tional pressures, it is easy to imagine reputational cascades with re­
spect to actions or stated beliefs.9 Suppose, for example, that A and B 
would think ill of anyone who argues that the minimum wage should 
be significantly increased. C, who is not sure what to think about a 
higher minimum wage, might be unmoved privately by the views of A 
and B, but nonetheless might not want to incur the wrath of A and B, 
or to seem ignorant of basic economic principles, or to appear indif­
ferent to economic efficiency. If so, C might show no enthusiasm for 
an increase in the minimum wage, or might even agree with A and B 
that an increase would be a bad idea. If D is otherwise in equipoise, 
she might be most reluctant to oppose A, B, and C publicly. Mounting 
reputational pressures might well lead E, F, G, and H, and many more, 
8. On reputation and signaling in general, see ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 
(2000). 
9. See KURAN, supra note 3. 
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to join the bandwagon. Eventually a large number of people might 
speak as if the minimum wage should not be increased. The result 
would be to affect academic discussion of government's role in the la­
bor market, including the treatment of this topic in articles and books. 
Here, too, a highly stylized example seems to help account for 
many shifts in the academic world. The rise of feminism within legal 
academia undoubtedly has a great deal to do with reputational and in­
formational incentives. In the early 1980s, those who expressed con­
tempt for feminist scholarship were rarely punished for doing so, and 
were sometimes rewarded. Currently those who express contempt for 
feminist scholarship generally (of course not always) put their reputa­
tion in considerable danger: If a young academic chooses to write on 
certain topics, or from certain points of view, the reputational sanc­
tions might be quite severe. At the University of Chicago Law School, 
I cannot recall many faculty members expressing public support for a 
substantial increase in the minimum wage, though I would not be sur­
prised if more than one faculty member actually believes that such an 
increase would be a good idea. Five years ago, those who borrowed 
from behavioral economics were viewed with considerable suspicion 
inside the world of law and economics; through a cascade effect, this is 
decreasingly true. · 
It follows that "political correctness" is hardly a narrow phenome­
non involving the practices of left-leaning academics. Wherever repu­
tational pressures are in place, a form of "political correctness" will 
discipline action and public statements. Reputational cascades are a 
possible consequence. · 
V. GROUP POLARIZATION AND ACADEMIC "SCHOOLS" 
A closely related phenomenon helps explain the initial growth of 
academic fashions and gives some guidance on how to create, and how 
not to create, an academic "school." The phenomenon is that of group 
polarization.10 In brief, the idea behind group polarization is that when 
a group of people engages in deliberation, group members will move 
toward a more extreme position in line with their predeliberation incli­
nations. This is the typical pattern among deliberating bodies. Thus, 
for example, a group of Federalist Society members, inclined to sup­
port originalism, is likely to be extremely enthusiastic about origi­
nalism after discussing it with one another. So, too, a semiformal or­
ganization of law professors, meeting once a month, is likely to emerge 
with a stronger commitment to critical race theory if its members are 
inclined, before discussion, to be favorably disposed toward critical 
race theory. It would be easy to multiply examples. 
10. See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 1986); Cass R Sunstein, Delib­
erative Trouble: Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000). 
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Massive evidence, from many different countries, supports the ba­
sic prediction. Why does group polarization occur? Though no cascade 
need be involved,11 the two principal explanations are close to the ex­
planations for informational and reputational cascades. The first in­
volves informational influences. In a deliberating group with an initial 
tendency in favor of X and against Y, there will be a disproportionate 
number of arguments in favor of X, simply because most people will 
speak out on behalf of X. Group members will have thought of some, 
but not all, of the arguments in that direction. After deliberating, the 
arguments for X will seem stronger to individual members, and the ar­
guments for Y will seem even weaker. It is to be expected that discus­
sion will move people to a more extreme form of their original enthu­
siasm for X. 
The second explanation for group polarization points to social in­
fluences. Most people, emphatically including professors of law, care 
about their reputations and their self-conception. Suppose, for exam­
ple, that you are inclined to think that affirmative action does not of­
fend the Constitution, but you are not entirely sure; suppose too that 
you find yourself in a group that also rejects the idea that affirmative 
action offends the Constitution. If you think of yourself as the sort of 
person who is, more than most, inclined to support the constitutional­
ity of affirmative action programs, you might move a bit, if only to 
maintain your reputation within the group and your self-conception on 
the issue at hand. The evidence strongly supports the proposition that 
this happens.12 
In the academic context, the lesson is simple. A group of like­
minded people, thinking about some issue or topic, is highly likely to 
move toward a more extreme position, not merely fortifying but am­
plifying their predeliberation inclinations. Through this route, it is pos­
sible to make some progress in understanding the creation and effects 
of academic "schools." In the early 1980s, for example, the critical le­
gal studies movement flourished at Harvard Law School in particular, 
no doubt in part because of the presence of members who talked a 
great deal with one another and fueled their predeliberation inclina­
tions. Several influential books emerged from these discussions.13 In 
roughly the same period, the Federalist Society was created at Chicago 
and Yale, and the existence of a group of like-minded people un­
doubtedly helped to fuel certain commitments. In fact, it is reasonable 
to speculate that the growth of conservative legal thought, within both 
faculties and student groups, has had a great deal to do with the exis-
11. This is because group polarization can result from simultaneous independent influ­
ences on group members. 
12. See BROWN, supra note 10. 
13. See, e.g., ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1985). 
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tence of a collection of people who are relatively well-organized and 
who are able to ensure that like-minded people can find some kind of 
home. 
VI. QUALIFICATIONS, EXTENSIONS, IMPLICATIONS 
Informational and reputational influences, as well as group polari­
zation, play a significant role in academic life. Cascade effects are pre­
sent here as elsewhere. For this reason, we should expect a large num­
ber of fads and fashions in the academic study of law. I would predict, 
for example, that a citation analysis would show many academic "bub­
bles" - rapid rises and declines in references to certain ideas and 
people.14 But this basic sketch omits important parts of the overall pic­
ture. 
A. Leaders, Followers, Polarizers 
With respect to both informational signals and reputational pres­
sures, all people are not created equal. Some carry more weight than 
others. For example, the signals sent by well-known academics, and 
academics at well-known schools, are likely to be especially loud. If 
faculty members at Yale end up endorsing a new method for under­
standing law, there might seem to be particularly good reason to take 
that method seriously. And it is less likely that people who embrace 
the method will face the kind of reputational sanction that could be 
imposed if the method were being used at a little-known school. Those 
who are in a position to start cascades operate as leaders, above all be­
cause of the social amplification of their voices.15 Note that this ampli­
fication can occur independently of the merits of the argument being 
made. In listening carefully to well-known people, or to people at well­
known schools, followers are probably behaving rationally, because 
such people are unusually likely to be interesting or correct, simply as 
a statistical matter. But there are no guarantees here, and hence ar­
guments can be amplified even if they are meritless. (Perhaps the re­
sulting bubble will eventually pop, as discussed below.) 
Some of the relevant leaders are simply saying what they think to 
be true; others affirmatively want followers, perhaps because they 
seek status, or perhaps because they want to ensure that their ideas 
are disseminated. Such people take steps self-consciously to promote 
cascade effects, perhaps by organizing conferences, reading groups, or 
even journals. More specifically, we can describe as "polarization en­
trepreneurs" those people who foster deliberative groups of like-
14. Some support can be found in Robert Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Sta­
tistical Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 527 (2000). 
15. Cf. GARY BECKER & KEVIN MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS 140-43 (2001). 
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minded people and ensure that participants share a common method­
ology or point of view. Exclusion of outsiders, and inclusion of a large 
number of insiders, is an important component of this strategy. 
An obvious implication is that if the goal is to spread ideas, it is 
probably best to begin by promoting discussion among groups of like­
minded people. If members of such groups speak mostly or only to 
one another, views might become entrenched, and the entrenchment 
among the views of increasingly large groups might initiate a cascade 
effect. A much worse strategy - often a doomed strategy - is to en­
sure that people with new ideas are placed in heterogeneous groups, 
where their ideas are unlikely to travel, or might be squelched, or 
might even be subject to self-silencing. 
In fact, the forces here are compounded by another: the availabil­
ity heuristic. It is well known that certain facts and ideas are cogni­
tively "available," or highly salient, and that this cognitive availability 
can exert a large influence on beliefs and decisions.16 If a leader, or an 
idea, ends up widely known, through independent decisions or 
through cascade effects, dramatic changes in scholarly paths can be 
expected. 
B. Starting and Stopping Cascades 
Some people are relatively immune to the influences discussed 
here. As I have suggested, people who are confident about their views 
are especially likely to resist informational and reputational incentives. 
The point suggests that in some arenas, cascades are likely to arise 
quite infrequently. Academic areas are highly variable on this count, 
and academics in some domains have a great deal of confidence, which 
immunizes themselves from cascade effects. In fields with well­
established methods and goals, we should expect cascades to be un­
common. In the sciences, for example, large-scale shifts certainly oc­
cur, but the existence of settled methods makes cascade effects un­
likely17 - far less probable than in, for example, comparative 
literature. Law, economics, and psychology are perhaps intermediate 
cases. 
This point raises an important question: When and why do aca­
demic cascades start and stop? A crucial reason has to do with external 
shocks. Suppose, for example, that a group of people believes some 
fact. Suppose that evidence shows that the belief is false. The belief 
will fade because it has been demonstrated to be wrong. 
But external shocks can take many different forms. Sometimes 
academic trends, especially in law, have nothing to do with demon-
16. See JONA THAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (3d ed. 2000). 
17. This is a possible reading of THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCilJRE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTION (1970). 
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strated fact, but are greatly affected by what happens outside of the 
academic domain. For example, the selection of Antonin Scalia to be a 
member of the Supreme Court undoubtedly had a great deal to do 
with the legitimation of originalism and textualism, methods favored 
by Justice Scalia. This is partly because Justice Scalia's opinions pro­
vided a kind of focal point for academic debate; it is also because his 
office conferred a kind of legitimacy on arguments that might other­
wise be easy to dismiss. Nor is it irrelevant that some of Justice Scalia's 
law clerks became academics. In fact, a significant source of informa­
tional and reputational influences will come, directly and indirectly, 
from the selection of Supreme Court clerks, and from the choice, 
among clerks of particular justices, to become law professors. In a pre­
vious generation, the law clerks of Felix Frankfurter, greatly influ­
enced by Frankfurter, became influential academics; the same appears 
to be true of Scalia clerks today. 
More generally, the 1980 election of President Reagan made it 
most unlikely that the Supreme Court would continue to use the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses as bases for announcing a 
series of new rights for disadvantaged people. Sensibly enough, aca­
demics interested in social reform showed decreasing interest in elabo­
rating legal doctrine for that purpose. Perhaps the rise of interest in 
constitutional deliberation outside of the courtroom had something to 
do with the Court's lack of receptivity to the professors' arguments. 
Perhaps diminished interest in judicial review had something to do 
with the changing composition of the Court.18 Highly visible public 
events with legal dimensions, such as the 1998 Clinton impeachment 
and the 2000 postelection struggle between George W. Bush and Al 
Gore, will inevitably affect people's choice of what to write about. 
(Perhaps Bush v. Gore will inaugurate a new era of neorealism, ques­
tioning the division between law and politics.) Academics may or may 
not follow the election returns, but in law, the election returns can set 
the academic agenda. 
Other external shocks can come from developments in adjacent 
fields. If, for example, economists show a great deal of interest in the 
idea of spontaneous ordering, academic lawyers are likely to show an 
interest in that topic, too. Part of the reason is informational: the fact 
that a certain topic interests economists is likely to be important to 
academic lawyers, many of whom care about what economists think. If 
there is a resurgence of interest in utilitarianism within philosophy, 
law professors are likely to write about utilitarianism. The extraordi­
nary interest in the work of John Rawls confirms this point. Critical 
theory provides another case in point, with Jurgen Habermas and 
Michel Foucault, for example, exerting a significant influence on legal 
18. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWA y FROM THE COURT (1999). 
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scholarship by virtue of their prominence within closely related fields. 
Of course, developments within adjacent fields might well be a prod­
uct of the kinds of influences discussed here. 
There is a final issue, perhaps in tension with the general argument 
offered thus far. It is useful to distinguish between ideas and methods 
on which multiple people can build for a long time, and ideas and 
methods that do not lead to much in the way of further work.19 The 
notion that people are rational, self-interested profit maximizers is fer­
tile, in the sense that it has applications to many domains of law, 
helping to produce predictions that can be tested and used. Though it 
is too early to say, I believe that the same is true for the notion that 
people are boundedly rational, and also for the claim that people are 
not only self-interested.20 The idea that law is pervasively based on 
male practices and understandings is also easily used as a basis for as­
sessing, or reassessing, many domains of law. But some claims tend to 
"burn out," in the sense that once they have been voiced, there is little 
that can be done with them, even if they are true. Perhaps this is the 
case for the contention that law is "political," an important and illumi­
nating partial truth, but one with which it is not easy, in the aftermath 
of legal realism, to do a great deal of illuminating further work. 
CONCLUSION: THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
Academics, like everyone else, are susceptible to informational 
and reputational influences, and cascade effects are as likely to be 
found in the academic domain as elsewhere. Notwithstanding the ex­
pertise and confidence of many academics, academic life has its own 
fads and fashions, and the factors. discussed here play a role in their 
development. I believe that these factors have played a role in many 
trends in legal theory, including critical legal studies, economic analy­
sis of law, feminism, textualism and originalism in constitutional law, 
critical race theory, rights-based accounts associated with Ronald 
Dworkin and others (many at New York University), law and litera­
ture, and (more recently) behavioral law and economics. 
By way of conclusion, it is worth emphasizing that the basic ac­
count contains both a prescription and a cautionary note. The pre­
scription is that those who seek to promote ideas will do best to en­
sure, above all, that those ideas have an opportunity to develop 
through frequent discussions among like-minded people. Most would-
19. Cf the discussion of progressive and degenerate research programs in Imre Lakatos, 
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in CRITICISM AND THE 
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970). 
20. See RICHARD THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991); BEHAVIORAL LAW 
AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
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be "schools" fail, but those that succeed often transform the field; and 
when they do so, group polarization is part of the reason. 
The cautionary note is that in law and many other academic fields, 
ideas may spread and prosper, not because they are good, but because 
dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of imperfectly informed people 
have fortified the very signals by which they have been influenced. 
Whether bad ideas can prosper for a long time is another matter. Fre­
quently good arguments and good evidence will puncture them, at 
least when there is agreement about the underlying criteria. But if the 
account here is correct, longevity, even for bad ideas, is hardly out of 
the question. 
